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JOINING THE INSURER AND INSURED
IN AUTOMOBILE CASES
V
J. WALTER McKENNA*

M

AY the insurance company be joined as co-defendant with the
insured who is being sued by an injured person as a result of an
automobile accident? This question faces the plaintiff's attorney at the
outset of his action. Its answer is of vital importance not only to the
plaintiff but also to the insurance company.
Viewed as a strictly pleading problem, the question concerns the
joinder of parties defendant. The noticeable tendency of 'the code
pleading system in respect to this matter is to be extremely liberal in
permitting joinder as witness the sections of the Wisconsin Code relating to joinder of parties, relief against alternative defendants, bringing new parties into pending actions, joining claims of all persons
against same defendant arising out of same transaction. In fact, the
whole spirit of all codes is one of liberality and emphasis placed on
speed in litigation, preventing multiplicity of actions, diminishing costs,
and prohibiting useless quibble over form which characterized the common law system of pleading. It would appear from this viewpoint that
joining the insurance company as co-defendant with its insured with
whom it has such a close relationship, would be proper in order to
carry out further the intent of the legislature in adopting the liberal
code pleading system.
However, the practical effect of forcing the insurance company to
appear openly in court and become known to the jury as the defendant
who must pay any verdict or at least part of it, has probably been the
undisclosed but nevertheless the true reason for the constant and bitter
fight against legislation of this kind. The attitude of the insurance companies appears to be that they would rather be like the ghost of
Hamlet's father whose presence was felt but who was not seen. It cannot be denied that knowledge of the fact that a defendant is insured
has effect upon juries. Many trial attorneys are as anxious for the
jury to know of the company's presence in the case as is the attorney
for the insurance company to keep it a secret. The reason is obvious.
Experience teaches that juries will render verdicts for larger sums if
the insurance company rather than the individual insured must pay.
Likewise, on close questions of negligence a jury is apt to feel that
because the insurance company has such large resources, the insurance
company should pay in case of doubt. The reason for such attitude is
difficult to explain. Perhaps, it grew out of the early feeling of fear
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that the public felt when it observed the growth in power and resources
of corporations. Another reason may be the distrust in the honesty and
fairness of insurance corporations in view of some of the corrupt
practices that many engaged in before the state began to regulate and
control their actions. How far has this attitude of the jury been overcome by changing ideas about the corporate form of doing business
and the educational method used by many corporations to build up
public good will? Maybe there has been a change for the better but
evidently, from a study of the attempts by insurance companies to
evade legislative mandates that they appear in open court as visible
defendants, the insurance companies still feel that they cannot be: considered on a par with the individual defendant as far as equal treatment by juries is concerned.
Prior to the time of the passage of statutes concerning the right to
join the insurance company with the insured, the cases in Wisconsin
and in other states, too, clearly show the fear of bias and prejudice
being aroused in the minds of the jury by permitting them to know that
somewhere in the background of the case hovered an insurance company as the undisclosed party. A few examples of Wisconsin cases will
illustrate this statement.
The case of Howard v. Beldenville Lumber Co., 129 Wis. 98, 108
N.W. 48, involved an action for personal injuries. During the impaneling of the jury plaintiff's attorney remarked, "I don't know if this is
the proper time and place to mention anything with reference to the
fact of a casualty insurance company being interested in this case."
Then followed a long colloquy between court and counsel, on both
sides, as to the propriety of examining the jury respecting whether they
were interested in any casualty company concerned in the litigation
and whether or not defendant's attorney represented such a company.
The Supreme Court criticized plaintiff attorney's statement as well as
the long colloquy following and stated that it came dangerously close
to being prejudicially erroneous. It was further stated that the remark
and the proceedings following it had a tendency to create impressions
in the minds of the jurors prejudicial to a proper consideration of the
case in hand. Of course, the right of plaintiff's attorney to examine
jurors as to their interest in any casualty insurance company as a basis
for challenge was recognized but the remarks prior to such a question
were improper.
In Faberv. C. Reiss Coal Co., 124 Wis. 554, 102 N.W. 1049, upon
examination of a juror on the voir dire, he was asked by plaintiff's
counsel whether he was a stockholder in the Traveler's Insurance Company. Defendant's counsel objected. Further talk occurred concerning
the matter between counsel and court. During it the plainti's counsel re-

THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

marked thta the insurance company had undertaken to pay any judgment that might be recovered and he therefore deemed it proper to press
the inquiry. Upon appeal, the Court stated that while it was proper to
inquire of a juror whether or not he was pecuniarily interested in an
insurance company, yet counsel must not communicate improper matters to the jurors or to the court within their hearing in connection with
such inquiry. The reason was that such improper matters might convey
prejudicial information to the jurors. However, the circumstances of
this case and the instruction of the trial judge prevented the remarks
of counsel from constituting prejudicial error.
Again in Dixon v. Russel, 156 Wis. 161, 145 N.W. 761, in a case
in which plaintiff was suing defendant for personal injuries, the trial
court refused to permit the jurors to be examined as to their business
relations with the Royal Insurance Company or with the Casualty
Company of America. On appeal, the Court held such ruling was correct in view of the fact that there appeared to be no connection between
case on trial and these insurance companies. In the opinion this statement was made by the Court: "Time should not be wasted, nor prejudice injected into a case, by an examination of jurors to determine their
qualifications on a subject that is not even claimed to be relevant and
which cannot be seen or presumed by the court, to be so." Note in this
quotation the words, "nor prejudice injected into a case."
Then, in Lozon v. Leamon Bakery Company, 186 Wis. 84, 202
N.W. 296, an automobile collision case, on voir dire of the jurors,
plaintiff's counsel asked ten of the jurors whether he or she had any
business relations with casualty or indemnity insurance companies
carrying insurance on automobiles. There was no further inquiry along
this line. Defendant's counsel in his brief pointed out the serious abuses
which are practiced when counsel for the plaintiff in personal injury
cases, improperly attempt to prejudice jurors by indirectly suggesting
that a rich corporation and not the defendant will be called upon to
pay any judgment which may be rendered. On appeal, the Court refused to consider counsel's inquiry as prejudicial in view of circumstances of this case.
But, in the case of Smith v. Yellow Cab Co., 173 Wis. 33, 180 N.W.
125 an automobile collision case, plaintiff's counsel attempted by repeated questions to a witness to find out of the defendant was insured
in the company he represented and if so, for injury to person as well
as to property. Objection was sustained to all such questions. On appeal
it was held that such persistent effort on part of counsel to prejudice
the jury against defendants by attempting to show that they were
insured was error. The case was not reversed for this error because
other reasons saved it.
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In Remmel v. Czaja, 183 Wis. 503, 198 N.W. 266 another collision
case, plaintiff's unnecessary, improper, and repeated questions to defendant's driver and another witness referring to the fact of an insurance company not a party to this action, being liable over for payment
of any damages which plaintiff might recover against the defendant
was condemned. But for the failure of defendant's counsel to object,
the case would probably have been reversed.
A reference by plaintiff's attorney in Papke v. Haerle, 189 Wis. 156,
207 N.W. 261, to an insurance company in an attempt to impress the
jury with the fact that defendant was insured, was declared by the
Court to be improper and unethical.
The first Wisconsin statute which was aimed at permitting the disclosure of the presence of an insurance company in automobile cases
is found in Chapter 341 of Laws of 1925, creating section 85.25. This
section provided as follows:
' "Any bond or policy of insurance covering liability to others by
reason of the operation of a motor vehicle shall be deemed and construed to contain the following conditions: That the insurer shall be
liable to the persons entitled to recover for the death of any person,
or for injury to person or property, caused by the negligent operation,
maintenance, use or defective construction of the vehicle described
therein, such liability not to exceed the amount named in said bond or
policy."
The reasons for its enactment were stated by the Court in Fanslon v.
Federal Mutual Insurance Co., 194 Wis. 8, 215 N.W. 589, in the following words: "We have no doubt that 85.25 was enacted in response
to a widespread belief that inasmuch as insurance of this nature inures
in a large measure to the benefit of those who are injured by the operation of automobiles, and inasmuch as by the terms of such policies, generally speaking, the insurance company reserves the right to control
the defense of actions arising by reason of such injuries, good public
policy should permit the person injured, where the liability of the
owner of such automobile is covered by liability insurance, to make the
insurance company which insured or indemnifies the owner a party to
the action; thus not only revealing to the court and jury the true parties
in interest to the litigation, but preventing such injustice as resulted in
Glatz v. General Acc., F & L. Assur. Corp., 175 Wis. 42, 183 N.W.
683."
In the case of Ducommun v. Inter-State Exchange, 193 Wis. 179,
214 N.W. 616, we find an attempt to make use of the right granted
under this section. In this case the plaintiff, Robert Ducommun, brought
action to recover for injuries to person and damage to property sustained in an automobile accident against the defendant, William Strong.
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The insurance company, Inter-State Exchange, which had issued a
policy of insurance to Strong, was made a party defendant. The insurance company demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did
not state a cause of action against it. The trial court overruled the
demurrer and appeal was taken from that order. The Supreme Court
upheld the right of the plaintiff to join the insurance company with the
insured in this action. The major argument of the insurance company
that its policy was one of indemnity only which imposed no direct
liability was not successful. It was stated in the opinion that in passing
such legislation as section 85.25 there was a valid exercise of police
power over insurance companies on the basis of that well-known theory
of a business "affected with a public interest." And further, it was said
that section 85.25 imposed direct liability on the defendant insurance
company as if it had incorporated the provisions of the section into the
body of the policy. The Court said: "Sec. 85.25 applies to any-that
is, to all-policies of insurance covering liability to others by reason of
the operation of a motor vehicle."
Any argument that section 204.30 of the Statutes which in effect
requires every policy of insurance against personal injury or property
damage caused by any motor-driven vehicle to contain a provision that
the insolvency or bankruptcy of the person insured who is liable for
the loss or damage sustained shall not release the insurance carrier and
that in all cases where execution on the judgment has been returned
unsatisfied, the insured shall have a right to recover of the insurance
company the amount of the judgment secured in the action against the
negligent driver of the automobile, was in conflict with 85.25 was dispelled by this decision. Section 204.30 was held to apply to special situations such as found in Glatz v. General Acc., F. & L. Assur. Corp.,
175 Wis. 42, 183 N.W. 683, while section 85.25 applies generally. One
section supplements the other to assure recovery. A similar situation is
found when Section 263.04 relating to joinder of causes of action in the
same complaint is compared with Section 260.11 which permits joinder
in the alternative of defendants. A study of these sections will show
that they are in obvious conflict. Yet it was held in DeGroot v. People's
State Bank of Reeseville, 183 Wis. 594, 198 N.W. 614, that Section
263.04 relating to joining of causes of action applied generally but
Section 260.11 concerning joining defendants in the alternative applied
to peculiar situations and therefore, there was no conflict between the
two sections.
The idea of a consistent legislative scheme to assure recovery of
damages to those injured in the negligent sue of motor vehicles is seen
in the passing of Sections 85.25, 204.30 as well as 85.15, sub. 3, relating to service of process on non-resident owners of automobiles.
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The next case that called for added construction of Sec. 85.25 was
Fanslau, Administrator,v. FederalMutual Auto. Ins. Co., 194 Wis. 8,
215 N.W. 589. The facts of this case distinguished it from the Ducommun case (supra) and prevented the joining of the insurance company
as co-defendant with the insured. The facts were that the deceased,
Fred Fanslau, was riding as an invited guest in an automobile owned
and driven by Halvor Rogan when due to the alleged negligence of the
defendant driver it plunged off an embankment, causing fatal injuries
to Fanslau resulting in his death. Rogan was insured in the defendant
insurance company against loss or expense arising or resulting from
claims against loss or operation of his automobile. The insurance company was made a party defendant pursuant to 85.25. However, the
policy contained this provision: "This policy does not cover under
Section 1 against loss or expense arising or resulting from claims upon
the assured for damages if such claims are made on account of damages, bodily injuries or death accidently suffered or alleged to have
been suffered by any person riding in or upon the automobile described
in statement 3 of the schedule of statements, nor by any employees of
the assured while engaged in the course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of the assured, nor for the liability of others assumed by the assured under any contract or agreement." The trial
court felt that section 85.25 enlarged the terms of the policy and thus
permitted the joinder, overruling the demurrer of the insurance company. On appeal, the Supreme Court denied that the section enlarged
the policy terms so as to deprive an insurance company of the right to
limit their coverage or to issue such contracts of insurance or indemnity as they may choose. The quoted clause of the policy excluded any
possibility of liability here on part of the insurance company and consequently the complaint stated no cause of action against the insurance
company who was wrongly joined.
In other words, the accident must be covered by the issued policy.
Therefore, here is found the first limitation on the right to join the insurance company with the insured, namely, if by the terms of the
policy the insurer is not liable to the owner of the automobile for the
damages which may be recovered in the action, it may not be joined.
An added illustration of this limitation on joinder of the insurance
company with the insured is found in the case of Bro, Special Adm. .
Standard Accident Insurance Company, 194 Wis. 293, 215 N.W. 431.
The facts were that an action was brought by Hattie Bro as administratrix to recover for the death of her husband caused by injuries inflicted by an automobile owned by T. W. Moran and driven by Floyd
Nicol. The insurance company had issued a policy to T. W. Moran
and was made a party defendant by reason of section 85.25. The policy
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contained a provision which in effect did not provide coverage for the
policy holder if the automobile mentioned in the policy was driven
without permission of the named assured. In the trial court a judgment
was obtained against the company. On appeal the judgment against
the company was dismissed because there was insufficient evidence to
go to the jury on the question of express or implied permission by
policy holder for driver to use the car.
Again, in Bachhuber v. Boosalis and American Indemnity Company,
200 Wis. 574, 229 N.W. 117 this limitation is well-stated. In this case
when the insurance company was joined as co-defendant with the insured, Boosalis, who failed to appear, it defended on the ground that
Boosalis the insured, had failed to carry out the terms of the contract
of insurance by neglecting to give immediate notice when the accident
happened and by failing to co-operate in defense of any action brought
against him by reason thereof and therefore, the insurance company
was discharged. The Supreme Court sustained the contention of the
company saying: "The provisions in the policy as to notice of accident,
claim for damages and co-operation in defense are conditions precedent, failure to perform which, the absence of waiver or estoppel constitute defenses to liability on the policy * * *.We have held recently

that Sec. 85.25 creates no liability where none exists by the terms of the
policy. It only provides direct liability and for joining the insurer with
the insured in an action where there is an ultimate liability on the
insurer on its contract of insurance. Stransky v. Kousek, 199 Wis. 59,
225 N.W. 401."
Up to this time the way seemed to be clear for carrying out the
obvious intention of the legislature in enacting section 85.25. However,
in 1928, the case of Morgan v. Hunt, 196 Wis., 298, 220 N.W. 224,
was decided by the Supreme Court and as a result there is established
a second limitation on the right to join the insurance company with
the insured under 85.25.
This case was an automobile accident case. The defendant, Hunt,
was the owner and driver of an automobile which in an accident caused
personal injuries to the plaintiff. The defendant, Hunt, was insured in
the General Casualty Company which was made a co-defendant by
virtue of 85.25. The policy, insuring Hunt, unlike the policies mentioned in the preceding cases, contained this provision: "No action shall
lie against the company until the amount of damages for which the
assured is liable by reason of any casualty covered by this policy is
determined either by final judgment against the assured or by agreement between the assured and the plaintiff with the written consent of
the company." The insurance company contended that by reason of
the above quoted clause in the policy that the action against them was
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prematurely brought. On appeal, it was held that the plaintiff could
not join the insurance company with the insured. It was said in the
opinion that section 85.25 imposed upon the insurance carrier a direct
liability to the injured person in all cases which came within the terms
of the policy. The statement in Bro v. Stan. Acc. Ins. Co. (supra) that
the section was a remedial statute which does not create a liability or
confer any right of action where none existed under the policy itself
was repeated here. The provision in the policy was likened to common
provisions in policies that suit shall not be brought upon the policy
until the expiration of a fixed period of time and therefore it did not
conflict with 85.25 and was valid and enforceable. The decision held
that the provision in question did not limit the liability of the carrier
or provide that the injured person cannot enforce liability under the
policy but that it simply fixed the time when such liability may be
enforced.
This decision, it is submitted, was good from a strict legal viewpoint yet its practical effect was to allow insurance companies to evade
the intent of the legislature in enacting 85.25. It would be a simple
matter for the insurance company to insert in all its future policies and
renewals a "no action" clause like the one in the Hunt case and thus
prevent the injured person from bringing into the open the insurer and
allowing the jury to be aware of its presence in the case. It is true
that this decision did not in any way hamper the injured person in
eventually collecting from the company for his injuries yet the reasons advanced in the Fanslau case (supra) for the enactment of 85.25
by the legislature do not appear to be limited to securing payment of
any just claims of the injured by the insurance company but also to
force the insurance company to appear openly in court.
However, this case made clear the second limitation on the right
of an injured person to join as a co-defendant the insurer with the
insured, namely, the presence in the policy of a "no action" clause.
Then, in 1929, the legislature decided to amend 85.25. The intent
of the legislature in making this amendment, it is submitted, was
caused by the Hunt case decision. By legislative act 85.25 was renumbered 85.93 and was amended to read as follows:
"Any bond or policy of insurance covering liability to others by
reason of the operation of a motor vehicle shall be deemed and construed to contain the following condition: That the insurer shall be
liable to the persons entitled to recover for the death of any person,
or for injury to person or property irrespective of whether such liability be in praesenti or contingent and to become fixed or certain by final
judgment against the insured, when caused by the negligent operation,
maintenance, use or defective construction of the vehicle described
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therein, such liability not to exceed the amount named in said bond or
policy."
The portion in italics was new. The question that presented itself
on reading the new portion of the section would be whether or not this
new portion would plug up the hole caused by the Hunt case decision
through which the insurance companies were escaping the requirement
of 85.25 that they might be joined as defendants in open court with
their insured.
The answer was not long in coming. The effect of 85.93 on the
Hunt case decision was squarely presented in the case of Bergstein v.
Popkin, 202 Wis. 623, 233 N.W. 572. This case concerned an accident
between an automobile and a horse and wagon. The plaintiff, the owner
of the horse and wagon, sued the owner of the automobile and joined
with him his insurance company as co-defendant. The insurance company promptly interposed a plea in abatement by reason of a "no action
clause" in its policy like the one in the Hunt case. The Supreme Court
held that the insurance company could not be joined with the insured
by reason of the "no action clause" and that section 85.93 resulted in
no change which nullified the usefulness of the "no action clause." The
decision is upheld on the theory that the legislature did not intend to
force the insurance company into open court where it might be treated
with prejudice and bias by a jury but rather the amendment was aimed
at a difficulty presented by Barteck v. Rotter, 197 Wis. 303. In that
case the question was whether or not the section gave the plaintiff the
right to maintain an action against both the defendant and insurance
carrier where the carrier's liability is created by an indemnity policy,
as distinguished from one which imposes direct liability. The Court
stated that the amendment sets that queston at rest but in no way
affects a contract which provides that the time for the commencement
of the action against the insurer shall be postponed until the damages
are ascertained. However, in a concurring opinion by Justice Fritz who
was joined in it by Justice Fowler, it is stated by Justice Fritz that in
his opinibn the amendment to 85.25 was enacted for the very purpose
of obviating the effect of the rule in Morgan v. Hunt. A quotation from
his opinion follows: "In my opinion, the amendment in 1929 by Ch.
467 was enacted for the very purpose of obviating the effect of the
rule in Morgan v. Hunt, supra. Its purpose was to impose upon an
insurer liability which was immediately enforceable whenever injury
and damages were sustained under circumstances and conditions which
were within the coverage of its policy. Irrespective of policy provisions
to the contrary, so far as those who sustained such damages were concerned, the right of recovery under the policy was not to be contingent,
or to be deferred until liability, including the amount thereof, had be-
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come fixed or certain by final judgment against the assured. The language used in Ch. 467, Laws of 1929, is fairly susceptible of construction consistent with that purpose, and as the statute is remedial it is to
be construed liberally, to further its purpose, and thus suppress the
mischief at which it was directed."
At this point the state of law on this problem of joining the insurance company with the insured appears to be as follows: the insurance
company may be successfully joined as a co-defendant with the insured
if the accident is covered by the policy issued to the insured and if the
policy does not contain a "no action clause" such as is found in the
A'organ v. Hunt case.
But, in 1931, the legislature again passed a statute which affects the
problem of joinder of the insured with the insurance company. That
statute is found in Section 260.11 and it reads as follows:
"*

* * In any action for damages caused by the negligent operation,

management or control of a motor vehicle, any insurer of motor
vehicles, which has an interest in the outcome of such controversy adverse to the plaintiff or any of the parties to such controversy, or
which by its policy of insurance assumes or reserves the right to control the prosecution, defense or settlement of the claim or action of
the plaintiff or any of the parties to such claim or action, or which by
its policy agrees to prosecute or defend the action brought by the plaintiff or any of the parties to such action, or agrees to engage counsel to
prosecute or defend said action, or agrees to pay the costs of such litigation, is by this section made a proper party defendant in any action
brought by plaintiff on account of any claim against the insured.
(2) When any insurer shall be made a party defendant pursuant
to this section and it shall appear at any time before or during the trial
that there is or may be a cross-issue between the insurer and the
insured on any issue between any other party and the insurer involving
the question whether the insurer would be liable if judgment should be
rendered against the insured, the court may, upon motion of any
defendant in any such .action, cause the person, who may be liable
upon such cross-issue, to be made a party defendant to said action and
all the issues involved in said controversy determined in the trial of
said action. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as prohibiting
the trial court from directing and conducting first a trialtas to whether
or not the insured is liable to the plaintiff or other party and directing
a separate trial on the issues involving the question whether under its
policy the insurer is liable for the payment in whole or in part of any
judgment against the insured or the amount of such liability. (1931
c.375.)
This new section was published on June 30, 1931. A mere reading of
this section will indicate that it has a much wider scope than either
sections 85.25 or 85.93. Its text is clearer in meaning and right of
joinder appears much broader in scope.
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The problem arises at once as to its effect on the existing state of
law in reference to joinder of the insured with the insuror. Does it
nullify the "no action" clause like the one upheld in the Hunt case and
the later Bergstein case? Does this new section affect the limitation on
joinder which requires the accident to fall within the coverage of the
policy? Has the insuror been finally forced to come into the open and
reveal its presence to the court and jury in automobile cases by this
new section?
At the time of writing this article no decision by the Supreme Court
gives an answer to these questions. It is true that in the case of
Pawlowski v. Eskofski,

-

Wis.

-,

244 N.W. 611, an attempt was

made to make use of this new section. In this case the plaintiff was injured in an accident which happened prior to the enactment in 1931 of
this new section. The injured plaintiff joined the insurance company as
a party defendant. The policy which covered the insured had been also.
issued prior to the time the new section went into effect. it contained
a valid "no action" clause. The insurance company made a plea in
abatement on the ground that the action was prematurely brought. The
trial court overruled the plea and the trial proceeded. Upon appeal the
insurance company contended that the new section had no application
to the policy in question because the statute was not retroactive. This
contention was upheld by the Supreme Court. It was stated that while
the new section was constitutional, yet it had no effect upon any policies
issued prior to June 30, 1931, the date of its publication.
Therefore, the questions presented in the preceding paragraphs
must remain unanswered until a case is presented involving a policy
issued subsequent to June 30, 1931.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) If the insurance policy was issued prior to June 30, 1931the plaintiff may properly join the insurance company with the insured
by virtue of section 85.93 unless (a) the policy contains a "no action"
clause like the one in Morgan v. Hunt, 196 Wis. 298, or (b) the accident is not one covered by the policy in force.
(2) If the insurance policy was issued subsequent to June 30,
1931-the new section 260.11 seems broad enough to nullify any "no
action" clause but it will probably make no change in the requirement
that the accident must be one which falls within the coverage of the
policy. However, conclusion (2) is conjecture and a decision by the
Supreme Court must be awaited to settle these questions.

